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AbstractChildren under 4 years have been claimed to lack adult-like semantic 
representations of belief verbs like ‘think’. Based on two experiments involving a 
truth-value judgment task, we argue that 4-year olds’ apparently deviant 
interpretations arise from pragmatic difficulty understanding the relevance of 
belief, rather than from conceptual or semantic immaturity.  
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1 Introduction 
Suppose John saved a cupcake in the fridge, but unbeknownst to him, Mary stole 
it and hid it in a drawer. If we asked a 3-year-old where John will look for it when 
he gets hungry, she would unhesitatingly respond that he will look in the drawer, 
because that’s where it is. This result has been replicated in hundreds of studies, 
with thousands of children from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds (for 
review: Wellman, Cross & Watson 2001). Although some task factors can affect 
children’s success to a limited degree, a robust generalization stands uncontested: 
children do not consistently respond correctly until age 4, and young 3-year-olds 
usually respond incorrectly—worse than if they guessed at random.  
Until recently, this generalization was taken as evidence that children under 4 
years cannot attribute false beliefs to others. Given this hypothesis, it would not 
be surprising if children’s interpretations of sentences with belief verbs like 
‘think’ were not adult-like, particularly in contexts involving false belief. And 
indeed, if we asked the 3-year-old where John thinks the cupcake is, she would 
also answer “in the drawer” (Wellman, Cross & Watson 2001; de Villiers 1995; 
                                                 
*
 Many thanks to our undergraduate research assistants (Sam Blitzstein, Faina Kostyukovsky, 
Jessica Lee, and Leah Whitehill), and the Attitudes and Theory of Mind research group (Rachel 
Dudley, Kate Harrigan, Naho Orita, Carolina Peterson, and Aaron Steven White). This work was 
funded in part by NSF grant #BCS-1124338. 
Lewis, Hacquard, and Lidz 
248 
de Villiers & Pyers 2002). The statement in (1) would be rejected on the grounds 
that the cupcake is not in the fridge (Sowalsky, Hacquard & Roeper 2009).  
(1) John thinks that his cupcake is in the fridge.  
We consider three competing hypotheses to account for young children’s 
responses to ‘think’ sentences and for the development that occurs around age 4. 
Under the Non-linguistic Development Hypothesis, the main change that occurs is 
the development of the ability to attribute mental states to others. Under the 
Semantic Development Hypothesis, the conceptual basis for understanding belief 
reports is already in place. What children must acquire are the syntactic and 
semantic structures that allow them to represent mental states linguistically. 
Under the Pragmatic Development Hypothesis, children have already acquired the 
conceptual and syntactic/semantic representations, and what develops is their 
understanding of the relevance of beliefs in certain contexts. 
2 The semantics and pragmatics of ‘think’ 
A hallmark of attitude constructions is that they can be true even if their 
complement is false in the world of evaluation. All that is required for (1) to be 
true in world w is that ‘the cupcake is in the fridge’ be true in John’s “belief 
worlds” (Hintikka 1971), not in w. Yet in certain contexts, the speaker endorses 
the truth of the complement in w: in so-called “parenthetical” uses (Urmson 
1952), the complement clause carries the main point of the utterance (and is thus 
endorsed by the speaker) and the main clause with the attitude verb is demoted to 
parenthetical status, serving an evidential-like function (Rooryck 2001a). 
(2) Mary is at the movies, {I think/John thinks}. 
Parenthetical interpretations are often associated with syntactic phenomena 
like preposing, as in (2) (Ross 1973; Bolinger 1968; Hooper 1975). This has led to 
syntactic accounts in which the parenthetical verb sits at the head of a functional 
projection for evidential markers (Rooryck 2001a; 2001b) or a sentence adverbial 
(Bresnan 1968). Yet parenthetical uses do not require (overt) parenthetical syntax: 
sentences with standard word order can receive either mental state or 
parenthetical interpretations, depending on whether it is the mental state itself that 
is most relevant in context, as in the exchange in (3), or the content of the mental 
state, as in (4).  
(3) A: Why is John mad at Bill? 
B: John thinks Bill was the thief.  
(4) A: Who stole the cupcake? 
B: John thinks Bill was the thief. 
Under a pragmatic account (Simons 2007), parenthetical interpretations arise 
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from the way attitudes are used in context. In (4), the literal content of B’s 
utterance is not a felicitous answer to A’s question, but its complement is. A 
hearer will reason that B is being cooperative and intending to answer A’s 
question. Given that the complement clause is a felicitous answer, B must endorse 
it (though, the hearer further reasons, B hedges somewhat; otherwise, she would 
have uttered the complement clause alone). The main point of B’s utterance, then, 
is the complement clause; the attitude serves a kind of evidential function, 
indicating B’s source of evidence. Note, finally, that although B’s utterance has a 
different main point in (3) and (4), both instances still involve an assertion about 
John’s belief, as evidenced by the fact that it can be subsequently denied in both 
cases (‘No he doesn’t. He thinks Mary was’).  
Whether the syntactic or the pragmatic analysis of parentheticals is correct—
or if the two coexist—the learner must be able to recognize which contexts 
support a parenthetical use, and which do not. Although it is an interesting 
question whether and when children acquire parenthetical syntactic structures, 
here we are primarily concerned with pragmatic competence.  
We ask whether both parenthetical and non-parenthetical uses are accessible 
to children, and to what extent. 
3 Belief attribution in development 
3.1 Belief attribution at the conceptual (non-linguistic) level 
Although it is difficult to define what a “concept” of belief is, we can enumerate 
observable consequences of having acquired it. A person with a mature concept of 
belief should understand how events can give rise to belief states, and how belief 
states in turn give rise to actions or emotions. The standard false belief task 
requires children to do both: they must infer a character’s belief state based on his 
past actions, and then predict his future actions based on that belief state.  
In Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) now classic change-of-location paradigm, 
children are told a story with two characters. In a representative story, Maxi helps 
his mom put away groceries. He puts some chocolate in the blue cupboard before 
going out. While he is away, his mom uses the chocolate to make a cake. In the 
“Standard” condition, she puts the leftover chocolate in the green cupboard 
instead of back in the blue cupboard. In the “Disappear” condition, she uses all 
the chocolate. Maxi returns to eat some chocolate. At this point, the child is asked 
where he will look for it. The correct response is that he will look in the blue 
cupboard, since that’s where he left it. Wimmer and Perner tested 3-, 4-, and 5-
year-olds. In the “Standard” condition, none of the 3-year-olds’ and only around 
half of the 4- and 5-year-olds responded correctly. The “Disappear” condition was 
somewhat better: most 3-year-olds and nearly all 4- and 5-year-olds were correct. 
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A host of additional studies followed with various manipulations of the task. 
Wellman, Cross and Watson’s (2001) meta-analysis of 178 studies found that the 
age trend reported in Wimmer & Perner 1983 is robust across studies: children 
perform significantly below chance until about 41 months, and above chance 
beginning around 48 months. The type of question (what the protagonist thinks, 
knows, or will do) has no effect on children’s performance. Four factors affect 
performance: children are more accurate when (i) the false belief is created with a 
deceptive motive, (ii) the participant actively helps create the false belief (e.g. by 
moving the object), (iii) the object is not present at the end (as in the “Disappear” 
condition above), or (iv) the protagonist’s false belief is explicitly stated or 
pictured. However, since these factors do not interact with age (they help all 
children equally, regardless of age), the authors conclude that the improvement 
from 3 to 4 years of age is due to real conceptual development rather than an 
increased ability to deal with the challenges of the task.  
Nevertheless, many researchers have argued that since traditional false belief 
tasks require an explicit decision and response, they are fundamentally flawed as 
measures of young children’s underlying competence. Clements and Perner 
(1994) used both “implicit” and “explicit” measures to test understanding of false 
belief. Children watched a change-of-location story. Their gaze direction (to the 
true or false location of the object) was recorded as they heard the prompt in (5). 
A few seconds later they were asked the standard direct question, as in (6). 
(5) I wonder where he’s going to look? 
(6) Sam wants to get the cheese. Which box will he open first? 
Looks to the false location after the first prompt (the “implicit” task) and 
points to it after the question (the “explicit” task) were considered correct. 3-year-
olds (2;11-3;2) performed much better on the implicit task (>75%) than the 
explicit task (<25%). The authors speculate that an explicit judgment requires 
comparing multiple representations of the situation, and this comparison is what is 
difficult for young children.  
More recent work suggests that even young infants have some understanding 
of false belief. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) found that 15-month-olds show 
“surprise” in a looking-time paradigm when an agent’s actions conflict with her 
beliefs, even when the beliefs are false. Subsequent studies have shown that 
children as young as 24 months (Southgate, Senju & Csibra 2007), 13 months 
(Surian, Caldi & Sperber 2007), and even 7 months (Kovács, Téglás & Endress 
2010) are sensitive to false beliefs in implicit tasks (for review: Baillargeon, Scott 
& He 2010). In light of these findings, it is unlikely that the development in the 
preschool years is the emergence of a new ability to attribute false beliefs.  
3.2 Linguistic belief reports 
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3.2.1 Spontaneous production 
Shatz, Wellman and Silber (1983) collected spontaneous speech samples from 2-3 
year-olds in a longitudinal study. Most children produced at least one mental verb, 
but very few of their utterances unambiguously referred to mental states. Over 
half were instances of ‘I don’t know’. The rest were mainly parenthetical, 
functioning to direct the conversation, as in (7), or modulate the degree of 
certainty, as in (8).   
(7) I thoughted we’d eat some cake. 
(8) I think this is a lamb. 
Bloom, Rispoli, Gartner, and Hafitz (1989) found that children’s (aged 2;0-
3;2) use of mental verbs in spontaneous speech was restricted compared to the 
input. For example, almost all instances of ‘think’ had a first person singular 
subject. Like Shatz et al. (1983), they concluded that in the majority of such 
utterances, the main clause verb is parenthetical. ‘Think’ and ‘know’ were usually 
used to modulate the degree of certainty.  
Diessel and Tomasello (2001) found that the “vast majority” of early uses of 
complement-taking verbs by 2-4 year-olds were “formulaic”, with other 
“performative” (our “parenthetical”) and “assertive” uses emerging around age 4.  
In summary, studies of children’s spontaneous production suggest that before 
age 4, they mainly use attitude verbs for parenthetical functions. However, this 
pattern may not be representative of their underlying competence: production 
often lags behind comprehension in development. Furthermore, parenthetical uses 
of attitude verbs are very common in adult speech: Diessel and Tomasello (2001) 
note that in parents’ speech in the transcripts they studied, formulaic uses were 
several times more frequent than other uses. Children’s usage may simply reflect 
the distribution in the input. 
3.2.2 Comprehension 
Moore, Bryant, and Furrow (1989) investigated children’s understanding of 
‘think’ and ‘know’ in cases where they are used to express the speaker’s degree of 
certainty. In a hiding game, children looked for a piece of candy in one of two 
locations based on the advice of two puppets. One puppet would say, I know it’s 
in the blue box, the other I think it’s in the red box. A child’s response was 
considered correct if they looked in the box suggested by the puppet who said he 
knew. 3-year-olds were at chance, while 4-year-olds mostly chose the correct 
location. These results suggest that 3-year-olds’ understanding of the parenthetical 
uses of belief verbs may be more tenuous in comprehension than in production.   
Johnson and Maratsos (1977) investigated 3- and 4-year-olds’ comprehension 
of think and know in situations involving true and false beliefs. In a representative 
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story, “Sally played a trick on John. While John wasn’t looking, Sally took his toy 
duck and hid it under this box. But she played a trick on John. She told him it was 
under this [other] box, and he believed her.” Children were asked a series of 
questions about the beliefs of Sally and John. Only children who correctly 
answered the question Where will John look for the toy? on the first or second 
attempt were asked the remaining questions. All 4-year-olds passed this criterion 
and performed fairly well on the belief questions. By contrast, less than half of the 
3-year-olds answered this question correctly on the first try. They answered ‘yes’ 
to all belief questions (e.g. Does John/Sally think/know the toy is under this box?) 
as though both characters were in states of true and false belief simultaneously. 
The authors concluded that a “sophisticated understanding of mental verbs” is 
emerging in 4-year-olds, but is quite limited in 3-year-olds.   
De Villiers designed a test of children’s ability to represent false complements 
that minimizes conceptual demands as much as possible (de Villiers 1995; de 
Villiers & de Villiers 2000; de Villiers & Pyers 2002). Children are presented 
with a story in which a character made a mistake, tells a lie, or has a false belief. 
The sentence with an attitude verb and false complement is provided directly, as 
in (9); children only need to remember the complement to succeed. 
(9) This girl saw something funny at a tag sale and paid a dollar for it. She 
thought it was a toy bird but it was really a funny hat. What did she think 
she bought? 
De Villiers & Pyers (2002) tested 3-4 year-olds three times over about 7 
months. In the first round, fewer than 30% passed; by the last round, about 90% 
passed. These results converge with the previous studies, suggesting that children 
are not able to represent false complements until around age 4.  
Sowalsky, Hacquard, and Roeper (2009) used a truth-value judgment task to 
test 2-5 year-olds’ understanding of sentences with ‘think’ and ‘according to’, like 
those in the examples in (10) and (11). In some stories a character had a false 
belief; in others it was unknown whether the belief was true or false.  
(10) Puppy thinks that it is raining outside. 
(11) According to Turtle, it is snowing outside.  
2-3 year-olds had difficulty with both sentence types, but were better with 
‘according to’ (66% correct) than ‘think’ (35%). 4-5 year-olds were near ceiling 
with ‘according to’ (90%), but still had difficulty with ‘think’ (4-year-olds: 56%; 
5-year-olds: 67%). All age groups were less accurate with false belief stories 
(52% overall) than when the reality was unspecified (66%). The relatively poor 
performance of 4-5 year-olds on ‘think’ is somewhat surprising given their 
success in previous studies (Johnson & Maratsos 1977; de Villiers 1995), 
suggesting that the truth-value judgment task might be a more rigorous test. 
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3.3 Summary and hypotheses 
The overall picture that emerges from previous studies is that while children have 
some implicit understanding of belief states very early on, they are not able to 
make use of that knowledge in explicit reasoning tasks until around age 4. 
Similarly, although children are producing ‘think’ by age 3, they are not adult-like 
in their production or comprehension until 4 years, if not older. Their early 
productions are generally parenthetical in function. In comprehension, they show 
consistent difficulty with false complements. We can now return to our three 
broad hypotheses about the nature of the development that occurs around age 4. 
3.3.1 The Non-linguistic Development Hypothesis 
Under the Non-linguistic Development Hypothesis, the primary change that 
occurs around 4 years is the ability to attribute false beliefs to others. This 
conceptual development is directly responsible for children’s improving 
performance on explicit false belief tasks, including those that test ‘think’.  
The recent evidence concerning young infants’ implicit understanding of false 
belief undermines the strong claim that children lack any concept of belief until 
age 4. We will consider a weaker version of this hypothesis: although children are 
able to attribute false beliefs to others, it is a cognitively demanding task that 
easily breaks down under stress. Standard false belief tasks prompt children to 
engage in an explicit reasoning process that contrasts someone else’s (false) belief 
with their own (true) belief. Considering both belief states simultaneously may 
overwhelm children’s limited processing capacity, causing them to respond based 
on the most salient and available representation—their own belief state. This 
hypothesis gains support from the fact that children’s performance on false belief 
tasks is improved when the conflict with their own beliefs is reduced (Wellman, 
Cross & Watson 2001)—for example, when the object is removed from the scene 
in Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) “Disappear” condition.  
Under this version of the hypothesis, the relevant developments are in general 
processing capacity and the ability to resolve representational conflicts. We need 
not be specific about which non-linguistic capacities are important: we will 
simply assume that whatever factors make an explicit false belief task difficult 
should equally affect tasks testing ‘think’ sentences in false belief scenarios.  
3.3.2 The Semantic Development Hypothesis 
According to the Semantic Development Hypothesis, what children acquire 
between the ages of 3 and 4 are the syntactic and semantic structures necessary to 
represent propositional attitudes. Based on the production data, it seems that 3-
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year-olds can use ‘think’ parenthetically, perhaps by lexicalizing frequent 
expressions like ‘I think’. Given this assumption, there are at least two possible 
explanations for their difficulty with false complements in comprehension.  
One possibility is that children use their parenthetical representation to 
interpret all sentences with ‘think’, and thus always judge such sentences based 
on the truth of the complement in the actual world. In this case, children must 
learn a new syntactic structure—a finite clause embedded under an attitude 
verb—as well as how to evaluate complement clauses with respect to worlds other 
than the actual one. This version of the hypothesis is similar to what has been 
proposed by Jill de Villiers (2000; 2005; 2007; de Villiers & Pyers 2002; de 
Villiers & de Villiers 2009). De Villiers goes further to say that the acquisition of 
these linguistic representations is what allows children to begin succeeding on 
standard explicit false belief tasks, perhaps by un-encapsulating belief 
representations in the social cognition system, making them available to higher-
level reasoning processes. This hypothesis gains support from the apparent tight 
connection between linguistic and non-linguistic measures of false belief 
understanding observed in longitudinal and training studies (Astington & Jenkins 
1999; de Villiers & Pyers 2002; Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003).  
A second possibility is that children do have a representation for non-
parenthetical uses, but their frequent experience with parenthetical ‘think’ has led 
them to assume that the complement of ‘think’ is always true. Their semantics for 
‘think’ would be comparable to factive ‘know’ or a non-factive that means ‘think 
correctly’. In this case, children would have to unlearn this semantics for ‘think’ 
based on positive evidence that it can be used with false complements.  
3.3.3 The Pragmatic Development Hypothesis 
Under the Pragmatic Development Hypothesis, children have acquired an adult-
like semantic representation of ‘think’ earlier than their performance on 
comprehension tasks would suggest. They have difficulty in tasks involving 
sentences with false complements because they tend to interpret ‘think’ 
parenthetically in situations where adults would not.
1
 That is, although they have 
both parenthetical and non-parenthetical interpretations of ‘think’ available, they 
do not have an adult-like understanding of which contexts license a parenthetical 
use, and which do not. They tend to underestimate the relevance of belief states, 
and the probability that a speaker is intending to comment on someone’s belief 
                                                 
1
 A variant of this pragmatic hypothesis would be that children have an adult semantics for think, 
but pragmatically strengthen think to think correctly under the assumption that people’s beliefs are 
generally correct (Philippe Schlenker, p.c.). Under either variant, we expect performance to be 
affected by contextual manipulations like the one used in Experiment 2. 
The semantics and pragmatics of belief reports in development 
255 
state rather than the state of the actual world.  
This hypothesis is consistent with children’s performance on standard false 
belief tasks. In a change-of-location task, children could easily misconstrue Where 
will Maxi look for the chocolate? as a question about where he ought to look, or 
as an indirect request for the child to help him find the chocolate. Children are 
more likely to understand that the question is about Maxi’s belief state if their 
attention is drawn to the false belief during the story, as in variations of the task 
where the child helps create the false belief or when deception is otherwise 
emphasized.  
4 Experiment 1 
At 4 years, children are beginning to show adult-like competence with false belief 
and false complements, but their performance on many tasks is still vulnerable. 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to test the hypothesis that children’s non-adult-like 
interpretations of ‘think’ arise from non-linguistic difficulty understanding false 
belief situations. We did this in two ways. First, we compared children’s 
performance with ‘think’ vs. ‘say’, as well as with ‘according to’, to see if we 
would replicate previous results that children perform better with ‘according to’ 
than with ‘think’ (Sowalsky, Hacquard & Roeper 2009). Second, we tested 
whether children’s performance improves when their own (true) beliefs do not 
conflict with those of the attitude holder, as has been found in non-linguistic false 
belief tasks as well as Sowalsky and colleagues’ truth-value judgment task. 
4.1 Subjects 
47 4-year-old children (3;9-4;3, mean 4.0; 16 boys) participated in the study. 
Participants were recruited from the Center for Young Children or the Infant 
Studies Database at the University of Maryland. All participants were typically-
developing monolingual English-speakers. Data from 4 additional children were 
excluded because they could not finish the task (n=2), their native language was 
not English (n=1), or because of experimenter error (n=1).  
4.2 Design 
Children were presented with stories about hide-and-seek. After each story, a 
puppet uttered a target sentence with ‘think’, ‘say’, or ‘according to’, and the 
child was asked to judge whether the puppet was “right” about what happened.  
4.2.1 Sample story 
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All stories followed the same template, illustrated in the following sample story.  
Introduce characters In the first scene, the characters (Swiper and Dora) are 
named and the experimenter confirms that the child can identify them. Swiper is  
identified as the Hider, Dora as the Seeker: Swiper is gonna hide, and Dora will 
look for him. So she’ll wait in the other room where she can't see.  
Hiding The child watches as Swiper hides behind the curtain. His yellow 
tail remains visible, protruding from behind the curtain. Then a squirrel (the 
Distracter) hides behind the toy box, leaving an identical yellow tail visible 
(Figure 1a). The experimenter points out the two clues to ensure that the child 
knows what evidence Dora will be using to guess Swiper’s location.  
SeekingDora reappears to state a guess about Swiper’s location based on 
one of the clues: Hmm, where should I look? Oh! I see a yellow tail behind the toy 
box! I know--Swiper is there! I'll look for Swiper behind the toy box. The Seeker’s 
script is intended to establish that she is just guessing based on the first clue she 
noticed, but she is nevertheless confident—she believes what she’s saying. Dora 
moves toward the toy box as she speaks and remains there for the rest of the story 
as a cue to her stated belief (Figure 1b).  
Target sentencesAt this point, the experimenter asks the puppet to say 
something about what’s going on in the story. The puppet delivers the target 
sentence, which contains either ‘think’, ‘say’, or ‘according to’: 
(12) a. Dora thinks that Swiper is behind the toy box.  
b. Dora said that Swiper is behind the toy box. 
c. According to Dora, Swiper is behind the toy box.  
   
(a)                                                        (b) 
 Figure 1 (a) Identical clues for the Hider (Swiper, behind the curtain) and 
Distracter (squirrel, behind the toy box). (b) The Seeker (Dora) guesses 
the location of the Hider. 
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After the child responds, the puppet delivers a filler sentence.  
Reveal hidersOnce the child has responded to both the target sentence and 
the filler, the Hider and Distracter emerge from their hiding places.  
4.2.2 Manipulations 
Within the stories, we manipulated whether the child had KNOWLEDGE of the 
Hider’s true location. In the knowledge condition, the child watched as the Hider 
and Distractor hid in the scene (as in the sample story). In the ignorance 
condition, the screen was obscured during the hiding, so the child did not know 
which clue corresponded to the Hider until after responding to the sentences. 
The main VERB of the target sentence was manipulated between subjects: 
children heard sentences with either ‘think’, ‘say’, or ‘according to’. We 
manipulated whether the target sentence referred to a Seeker with a true belief or 
a false belief (BELIEF TYPE). In the sample story, the target sentences are about a 
false belief. In the ignorance condition, it is unknown at the point of the target 
sentence whether the Seeker in question has a true or false belief. The truth of the 
target sentences (i.e., the target response) was counterbalanced. Table 1 shows 
the set of possible ‘think’ target sentences for the sample story. Note that the false 
belief sentences are those where the truth of the complement clause in the actual 
world conflicts with the truth of the whole sentence.  
4.3 Predictions 
We expected 4-year-olds to do well overall, since by that age they are beginning 
to pass tests involving false beliefs and false complements. However, to the extent 
that they are non-adult-like, our hypotheses make different predictions about 
which conditions will be the most difficult. 
The Non-linguistic Development Hypothesis predicts that children should 
 
Sample sentence 
Belief 
Type 
Sent. 
Truth 
Comp. 
Truth 
Boots thinks that Swiper is behind the curtain. TB T T 
Boots thinks that Swiper is behind the toybox. TB F F 
Dora thinks that Swiper is behind the toybox. FB T F 
Dora thinks that Swiper is behind the curtain. FB F T 
 Table 1 Target sentence types for Experiment 1, with BELIEF TYPE (TB = 
true belief; FB = false belief), truth of the sentence, and truth of the 
complement clause.  
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have difficulty with sentences involving a false belief. They should have less 
difficulty in the ignorance condition, since there is no possible conflict between 
their own beliefs and the Seeker’s. The VERB should have no effect on their 
performance, since the need to resolve a representational conflict arises regardless 
of whether the ultimate judgment is being made about thoughts or statements. 
Under the Semantic and Pragmatic Development Hypotheses, children 
respond primarily based on the complement clause. Thus, they should look most 
non-adult-like in the conditions where the truth of the complement clause in the 
actual world conflicts with the truth of the whole sentence: the false belief 
conditions. They should have difficulty in the ignorance conditions, because they 
will have no basis for judging the truth of the complement clause. They may show 
different patterns of responses depending on the VERB. 
4.4 Materials 
A list of 14 stories was created including a variety of scenes and characters. The 
locations of the Hider and Distracter were spread across the different hiding spots 
across trials, and the characters playing the Hider and Seeker rotated from story to 
story. Stories were illustrated and animated in Adobe Flash. Narration for each 
story was recorded and added to the videos.  
Two lists of target sentences were created. In each list, the order of sentences 
with respect to BELIEF TYPE and sentence truth was pseudo-randomized. Two 
filler sentences, one true and one false, were created for each story. The fillers did 
not involve belief. They were created using templates exemplified by (13)-(17). 
(15)-(16) were only appropriate in knowledge stories, and (17) in ignorance.  
(13) Dora is looking for Swiper {behind the toy box/behind the curtain}.  
(14) Swiper is really hiding {behind the curtain/behind the toy box}.  
(15) There's really a squirrel {behind the toy box/behind the curtain}.  
(16) We can see a yellow tail {behind the toy box/under the bed}.  
(17) Swiper is {behind the curtain or behind the toy box/behind the door or 
under the bed}.   
Each participant saw 2 practice trials, followed by 3 trials in each of 4 
conditions (KNOWLEDGE × BELIEF TYPE). The distribution of true and false 
sentences was counterbalanced across conditions. Since there were an odd 
number of trials per condition, the distribution is only fully balanced when both 
lists are taken together.  
4.5 Procedure 
Sessions took place in a quiet room with the child seated in front of a laptop. The 
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experimenter sat alongside the child, operating the puppet with one hand and 
coding responses with the other. Sessions were videotaped so that children’s 
responses could be coded later by an independent viewer.  
The experimenter began by explaining the task, introducing the puppet 
(“Drog”, a baby dragon who wants to learn how to play hide-and-seek), and 
obtaining the child’s assent to participate. To ensure that the child was 
comfortable telling the puppet whether he was right or wrong, the experimenter 
asked the puppet to label a few objects, and prompted the child to say whether the 
puppet was correct. Once the child had produced at least two yes and two no 
responses, the experimenter continued with the experiment. 
In each trial, the child watched the animated video alongside the puppet. After 
the story, the puppet uttered the target sentence. The experimenter prompted the 
child to judge the sentence by asking, Is Drog right? For the two practice trials 
(which included only filler sentences), the experimenter provided feedback if the 
child responded incorrectly. The form of the feedback was flexible, but often 
involved pointing out relevant parts of the scene, repeating parts of the story, or 
modeling the correct response. After the practice trials, the experimenter did not 
provide feedback. In general, the experimenter reacted to the child’s response by 
giving feedback to Drog: Good job, Drog—you got it right! or Silly Drog, you got 
that one mixed up! 
The filler sentence for each trial was chosen based on the child’s response to 
the experimental sentence. If the child accepted the sentence, a false filler was 
chosen; if the child rejected it, a true filler was chosen.  
4.6 Results 
Children’s responses were coded online by the experimenter and again from the 
video recording by a different person. Responses were coded as yes, no, I don’t 
know, or unclear. Only clear yes or no responses that were never revised were 
counted in accuracy rates. Video coders rejected trials in cases of experimenter 
error (3 out of 1420 trials), or when the child was clearly not attending or 
distracted (28 trials). Since most of the 4-year-old participants had fragile 
attention spans, coders only rejected trials in extreme cases where the child was 
out of her chair or talking over the story.  
4.6.1 Filler accuracy 
The fillers were designed to be easy to judge so they could be used as a criterion 
to exclude participants who could not understand or attend to the task. 3 subjects 
who had accuracy rates below the predetermined cutoff of 65% were excluded 
from analysis. For the remaining 44 subjects, filler accuracy ranged from 67% to 
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100% (mean = 87%, median = 90%). After exclusions, there were 16 subjects in 
each of the think and say conditions, and 12 in the according to condition.  
4.6.2 Truth-value judgments 
Accuracy rates for truth-value judgments were analyzed using logistic mixed 
effects models with fixed effects for BELIEF TYPE and KNOWLEDGE and a random 
effect for subjects. Binomial tests were used to compare accuracy to chance 
levels. See Figure 2 and Table 2 for a summary of results.  
ThinkThere was a significant main effect of BELIEF TYPE (p = 0.005): 
children were more accurate with true belief than false belief. There was also a 
significant interaction between BELIEF TYPE and KNOWLEDGE (p << 0.001): the 
asymmetry based on BELIEF TYPE only held in the knowledge condition (as 
expected, since in the ignorance condition the belief type is in fact unknown).  
In knowledge stories, children were highly accurate in the true belief condition 
          
 (a)  (b) (c) 
 Figure 2 Results of Exp 1, by VERB: (a) think, (b) say and (c) according to. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on the 
binomial distribution. 
 
Knowledge Belief Type Think Say According to 
knowledge true belief 83%** 95%** 86%** 
 false belief 36%° 66%* 11%** 
ignorance true belief 69%* 75%* 43% 
 false belief 56% 73%* 44% 
 Table 2  Accuracy rates by condition for Experiment 1. Stars indicate that 
the accuracy rate was different from chance: ° p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.001. 
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(83%: above chance, p << 0.001), and inaccurate in the false belief condition 
(36%: marginally below chance, p = 0.08). In ignorance (collapsing across 
BELIEF TYPE), children were just above chance (62%, p = 0.02). There was no 
significant difference in accuracy between true belief (69%) and false belief 
(56%) sentences.  
Say As with think, there was a significant main effect of BELIEF TYPE (p = 
0.01) and a significant interaction between BELIEF TYPE and KNOWLEDGE (p = 
0.007). In knowledge stories, children were near ceiling in the true belief 
condition (95%: above chance, p << 0.001). Their accuracy in the false belief 
condition was lower, but still above chance (66%, p < 0.05). In the ignorance 
stories, children were above chance regardless of Belief Type (true belief: 75%, 
false belief: 73%, ps < 0.01).  
When the data from the think and say conditions were analyzed together with 
VERB as a fixed effect, there was a significant main effect of VERB (p = 0.02) and 
no interactions with other factors (ps > 0.1). Children’s performance in the say 
condition was better across the board without changing the general pattern. 
According toAgain, there was a highly significant main effect of BELIEF 
TYPE (p << 0.001) and a significant interaction between BELIEF TYPE and 
KNOWLEDGE (p << 0.001). In knowledge stories, children were highly accurate in 
the true belief condition (86%: above chance, p << 0.001), and near floor in the 
false belief condition (11%: below chance, p << 0.001). In ignorance stories, 
children’s accuracy was no different from chance (true belief: 43%, false belief: 
44%, ps > 0.5). 
4.6.3 Discussion 
Overall the results suggest that 4-year-olds are near adult-like in their 
understanding of ‘say’, but not ‘think’ or ‘according to’.  
With think, children’s accuracy was lower in the ignorance conditions than in 
the knowledge/true belief condition. This finding is surprising under the Non-
linguistic Development Hypothesis, since the ignorance condition reduces the 
complexity and representational conflict in the story. It is more consistent with the 
linguistic hypotheses, which predict difficulty in the ignorance condition where 
children are not able to evaluate the truth of the complement with respect to the 
actual world. Children may simply respond at random in this case. Although there 
were not enough such responses to analyze, children did answer “maybe” or “I 
don’t know” more often in the ignorance condition than in other conditions.  
Children’s responses to ‘according to’ suggest that they only evaluated the 
complement clause. They are near ceiling when the truth of the sentence aligns 
with the complement (true belief), and near floor when they conflict (false belief). 
They seem to respond at random in the ignorance condition, where they have no 
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way of evaluating the complement. This result is a striking non-replication of 
Sowalsky et al.’s (2009) finding that children were more accurate with ‘according 
to’ than ‘think’. In any case, the results provide a useful baseline for evaluating 
children’s responses to ‘think’: although they clearly are not adult-like, at least 
some children are doing more than responding to the complement alone.  
The Non-linguistic Development Hypothesis is not consistent with the 
difficulty in the ignorance condition. The pattern of responses with think 
sentences is consistent with a parenthetical interpretation, but it is not clear what 
sort of representation is giving rise to that interpretation.  
5 Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we manipulated the context in order to increase the relevance of 
beliefs. If children interpret ‘think’ parenthetically because they lack an adult-like 
syntactic/semantic representation for ‘think’, then no pragmatic manipulations 
should affect their responses. However, if parenthetical interpretations are due to 
a misunderstanding of the relevance of belief in context, it should be possible to 
improve performance by highlighting the beliefs.  
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, and thus is omitted here.  
5.1 Subjects 
17 4-year-old children (3;10-4;4, mean 4.1; 11 boys) participated in the study. All 
participants were typically-developing monolingual English-speakers.  
5.2 Design and materials 
The design was identical to Experiment 1, except that we only tested ‘think’ 
sentences. We made only one change to the stories: a second Seeker came out 
after the first Seeker and guessed the alternative location. The target sentences 
remained the same as those for Experiment 1; we counterbalanced whether the 
mentioned Seeker guessed first or second. Adding a second Seeker to the story 
creates a conflict of belief—only one of the two Seekers can have a true belief. 
This conflict was intended to highlight the relevance of beliefs in the story.  
The design was identical to Experiment 1, except that we only tested ‘think’ 
sentences. We made only one change to the stories: a second Seeker came out 
after the first Seeker and guessed the alternative location. The target sentences 
remained the same as those for Experiment 1; we counterbalanced whether the 
mentioned Seeker guessed first or second. Adding a second Seeker to the story 
creates a conflict of belief—only one of the two Seekers can have a true belief. 
This conflict was intended to highlight the relevance of beliefs in the story.  
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5.3 Predictions 
If children have an adult-like representation of ‘think’ available (the Pragmatic 
Development Hypothesis), then they should give more adult-like responses when 
the relevance of belief is highlighted. If children do not have an adult-like 
representation of ‘think’ (the Semantic Development Hypothesis), then this 
pragmatic manipulation should have no effect.  
5.4 Results 
See Table 3 for a summary of the results. As in Experiment 1, there was a 
significant main effect of Belief Type (p = 0.006) and an interaction with 
Knowledge (p = 0.003). In knowledge stories, children were highly accurate in the 
true belief condition (89%: above chance, p << 0.001), but no different from 
chance in the false belief condition (56%, p = 0.9). In ignorance stories, children 
were significantly above chance (82% overall, p << 0.001), with no significant 
difference between true belief (81%) and false belief (82%) sentences.  
In a model with the number of seekers added as an additional fixed effect, 
there was a significant main effect of NUMBER OF SEEKERS (p = 0.009), and no 
interactions with any other factors. That is, the overall pattern of responses was 
similar across the 1-seeker and 2-seeker stories, but children were more accurate 
overall with the 2-seeker stories (see Figure 3).  
5.5 Discussion 
The improved performance with 2-seeker stories suggests that 4-year-olds’ non-
adult-like interpretations of ‘think’ are not due to a deviant syntactic or semantic 
representation. In the 1-seeker stories, children may take the “Question Under 
Discussion” (QUD) to be about the location of the Hider—a natural assumption in 
a story about Hide and Seek. Thus, they treat the target sentence as though its 
complement carries the main point of the utterance, and thus respond to the truth 
of the complement in reality, as demonstrated in (18). In 2-seeker stories, on the 
other hand, the Seeker’s beliefs are more obviously central, and children are more 
often able to take them into account when judging the target sentences.  
(18) A: (Where is Swiper?)    (QUD) 
B: (Dora thinks that) Swiper is behind the toy box.  (Target) 
C: No—he’s  behind the curtain!   (Child) 
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6 Conclusion 
Our results indicate that 4-year olds’ difficulty with verbs like ‘think’ isn’t due to 
conceptual, syntactic or semantic immaturity: in contexts that emphasize the 
relevance of belief, they give more adult-like responses. We hypothesize that their 
difficulty is primarily pragmatic: children tend to underestimate the relevance of  
mental states to be what is being discussed, and therefore interpret ‘think’ 
parenthetically. Thus, even children who have adult-like conceptual and semantic 
representations can seem non-adult like in their comprehension of belief reports. 
What does this tell us about children’s pragmatic competence? In some 
aspects, they are quite sophisticated: they can construct a parenthetical 
interpretation for an attitude report based on (sometimes erroneous) guesses about 
speakers’ intentions and the underlying QUD. What they might have trouble with 
 
Knowledge Belief Type Accuracy 
knowledge true belief 89%** 
 false belief 52% 
ignorance true belief 81%**  
 
 false belief 82%** 
 Table 3  Accuracy rates by condition for Experiment 2. Stars indicate that 
the accuracy rate was different from chance: ** p < 0.001.  
 
           
 Figure 3  Accuracy rates by condition for Experiments 1 (1-seeker stories) 
and 2 (2-seeker stories). Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals based on the binomial distribution.  
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is accommodating a QUD different from the one they have initially hypothesized.  
Preliminary results using similar methodology suggest that even younger 
children are able to give more adult-like responses in the right pragmatic contexts, 
providing further evidence that children have the relevant conceptual and 
semantic representations in place earlier than previously supposed.  
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